





EDWARD W. WYNKOOOP, *A Forgotten Hero*

LOUIS KRAFT

IN September of 1868, Lieutenant General William T. Sherman declared war against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. He went on to say, "It will be impossible for our troops to discriminate between the well-disposed and the warlike parts of those bands, unless an absolute separation be made."¹ He suggested Fort Cobb in Indian Territory, and promised that the Indians who congregated there would be free from attack—*unless deemed warlike*—but would be treated and fed as if prisoners.²

In November, the Cheyenne, Arapahoe and Apache agent, Edward W. Wynkoop, left for Fort Cobb as ordered. By a different route, a shipment of annuity goods was also on its way.³ Ned Wynkoop, whose relationship with the Cheyenne had begun just four years before, was filled with trepidation. On November

29, 1868, while still enroute to his destination, he penned his fears of the government's "determination to kill, under all circumstances, the Indians of my agency."⁴ He was certain his wards would respond to his call. As had always been his way, words were strong and to the point. But this time there was something else. Wynkoop had had it with what he considered the government's perfidy in its dealings with the red man. He tendered his resignation.⁵

Thus the Cheyenne lost the best white friend they ever had.

Just who was Ned Wynkoop, and how did he become the trusted "Tall Chief" of the Cheyenne in such a short time? And, more importantly, why did he resign in that cold November of 1868?

Born in Philadelphia in 1836, twenty years later he left home to find his way in the West.⁶ In the next few years he panned for gold in the Rockies, was appointed Sheriff of Arapahoe County, Kansas Territory, and was one of the founders of

Denver. During this time he scouted, explored, acted upon the stage, and married, getting himself in and out of trouble on numerous occasions.⁷ With the outbreak of the Civil War, Ned enlisted in the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry Regiment and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He would soon rise to the rank of captain. Performing admirably in the New Mexico campaign that halted the Confederate invasion of the West, he was promoted to major.⁸ With the transfer of the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry Regiment to the First Colorado Cavalry in November of 1862, Wynkoop took command of Camp Weld, just outside Denver.⁹

By May, 1864, he was in command of Fort Lyon, in southeastern Colorado.¹⁰ The scene was finally set for Ned to test his mettle as his assignment to a new command coincided with the beginning of an Indian war. Stock was stolen, several deserted Indian villages were destroyed, and, depending upon which side was telling the story, the other was the ag-

LEFT: *Edward Wanshear Wynkoop, 1861*
(Courtesy Colorado Historical Society.)

gressor.¹¹ At the end of the month, Colonel John M. Chivington sent the following communique to Ned: "The Cheyennes will have to be soundly whipped before they will be quiet. If any of them are caught in your vicinity, kill them."¹² Although unsuccessful in his attempts to engage the enemy, Ned proved himself a man of his times when he reported back to Chivington, "It is my intention to kill all Indians I may come across until I receive orders to the contrary."¹³

On June 14, 1864, Governor John Evans petitioned to organize a regiment of volunteers to serve for one hundred days for the purpose of fighting Indians. By August his en-



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treaty had become fact.¹⁴ The citizens of Colorado were elated. They wanted blood, for that was the only way they foresaw an end to the depredations. Local newspapers, like the *Black Hawk Daily Mining Journal*, constantly noted their readers' sentiments with reports such as, "So leaving out of view the inhuman cruelties practiced upon the defenseless people of the outer settlements, the prospect, not only of an absolute cessation of business, but also of utter starvation or abandonment of the country, stares us in the face."¹⁵

As the war extended through the summer, Wynkoop continued to share the opinions of his countrymen, calling the Indians "rapacious in their cruelty."¹⁶ However, events were about to happen that would cause him to suffer a complete turnabout in his convictions. This metamorphosis began on September 4, 1864, when three Cheyenne prisoners were brought to Fort Lyon. After deriding his soldiers for not killing the Indians outright, Ned asked One Eye, the leader of the three, why he risked his life by turning himself over to the whites. One Eye replied that he was prepared to die if by chance he could help bring about the end to the war that his people never wanted.¹⁷ He then produced a letter written for Black Kettle by William Bent's half-blood son, George. The note admitted to hostilities, then requested a council in the hopes of bringing about a peace. As a lure if offered the freedom of several prisoners.¹⁸

Wynkoop was taken aback. The Indians before him were something he had never encountered before. "I was bewildered with an exhibition of such patriotism, ...and felt myself in the presence of superior beings; and these were the representatives of a race that I had heretofore looked upon without exception as being cruel, treacherous, and blood-thirsty."¹⁹

It was a proposition that couldn't be refused. Without waiting for orders from his superiors, Ned set out on an errand the entire command considered foolhardy. If he expected

a warm greeting, he was quickly reminded of reality. After meeting six hundred warriors ready for battle, he shakily met the Cheyenne leaders in council. One by one the Indians angrily described the wrongs done them. Just as it looked as if the mission would end in disaster, Black Kettle spoke:

This white man is not here to laugh at us, nor does he regard us as children, but on the contrary, unlike the balance of his race, he comes with confidence in the pledges given by the Red man. He has been told by one of our bravest warriors that he should come and go unharmed.²⁰

Thus began a relationship, based upon trust, that would hurl Ned to the forefront of white/red relations. In Black Kettle he found a man whom he believed truly wanted peace at all costs, including the risk of his own life at his people's hands.

After agreeing to meet the next day, the soldiers set up camp twelve miles from where the council took place. While preparing for any breach of faith, Wynkoop was confronted with another problem. His men were close to mutiny, and wanted to return to Fort Lyon immediately. But Ned had come too far to be denied now. He knew he was doing the right thing and would not change his mind.²¹

His perseverance paid off. Four children were released during the next two days. One, five-year-old Isabelle Ubanks, said to Ned, "I want to see my mama." Wynkoop sadly reflected, "Poor child, she never saw her mama in this world."²²

Now certain that he could bring peace to Colorado, Wynkoop took it upon himself to lead seven Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs to Fort Lyon where he sent off a dispatch (on September 18, 1864) to Governor Evans, in which he proposed to bring the seven Indians to Denver to finalize the peace he knew was close at hand.²³ Ned never considered that he had superseded his authority. But that wasn't his biggest mistake. He had forgotten the white population didn't want peace.

Although angered by Wynkoop's



FIRST COLORADO TROOPS

ABOVE, STANDING, left to right: Captain Silas S. Soule, Captain James M. Shaffer, Captain Samuel H. Cook. SEATED, Captain Samuel M. Robbins, Dr. John F. Hamilton, Major Edward W. Wynkoop, and Colonel James H. Ford.

audacity, Evans agreed to a meeting outside Denver at Camp Weld. It took place on September 28, 1864.²⁴ The conference was recorded for posterity. Evans avoided the chiefs' plea, saying, "Whatever peace you make must be with the soldiers, and not with me."²⁵ Chivington added, "You are nearer Major Wynkoop than any one else, and you can go to him when you get ready to do

that."²⁶ Both Ned and the Indians believed the meeting had been a complete success, and Wynkoop told the chiefs to bring their people to Fort Lyon, as they would be safe there.²⁷

Riding a wave of exhilaration, Wynkoop stayed over in Denver to ease the citizens' fear of more bloodshed. The *Daily Rocky Mountain News'* editor, William N. Byers, was opposed to any peace with the Indians. However, Ned's persuasiveness convinced him that peace had arrived. The good news was published.²⁸ Pleased with all he had accomplished, the new peacemaker wrote in his report of October 8, 1864, "I think that if some terms are

made with these Indians, I can arrange matters so, by bringing their villages under my direct control, that I can answer for their fidelity."²⁹

As his new wards were starving, Wynkoop issued them prisoner allotments for ten days. However, efforts were well under way to eliminate the *new Indian lover*. On November 5, 1864, Major Scott J. Anthony replaced Wynkoop as commander of Fort Lyon. Ned was ordered back to Kansas to face charges of "being absent without proper authority."³⁰ Before Wynkoop left, on November 25, 1864, Anthony stated he would follow the policy of his predecessor.³¹



COLORADO HISTORICAL SOCIETY

CAMP WELD COUNCIL September 28, 1864

ABOVE, STANDING, left to right: unknown, unknown, John Smith, Interpreter, White Wolf (Kiowa), Bosse (Cheyenne), unknown, unknown. SEATED, Neva (Arapaho), Bull Bear (Cheyenne), Black Kettle (Cheyenne), One Eye (Cheyenne), unknown. KNEELING, Major Edward Wynkoop, Major Silas Soule, Provost Marshall.

Both Evans and Chivington had been criticized by the press for both provoking an Indian war and then doing nothing to end it. This was to end on November 27, 1864. Chivington and his *bloodless* one hundred dayers swept down upon the peaceful Cheyenne and Arapahoe encampment a short distance from Fort Lyon at a place called Sand Creek. A massacre resulted.³² Editor Byers quickly

discarded Ned's words of peace and joined the Chivington bandwagon. On November 30, 1864, the *News* reported, "It is unquestioned and undenied that the site of the Sand Creek battle was the rendezvous of the thieving and marauding bands of savages who roamed over this country last summer and fall."³³ The other major paper of the area, the *Black Hawk Daily Mining Journal*, had always felt this way, declaring the peace chiefs never could control their warring elements and only wanted peace because of winter. Ned heard of the slaughter while at Fort Riley, Kansas. His son reported he went "wild with rage when he heard of the crime committed by Chivington and his command, and demanded their trial and punishment."³⁴ Because of

his outspoken fury, the army, and Chivington in particular, were angry with Ned.³⁵ Their attempt to blacken his name failed. Wynkoop was not only exonerated from any wrongdoing, but was officially praised.³⁶ On December 31, 1864, Ned was given back his old command at Lyon, and ordered to assist in the investigation of Chivington's actions.³⁷ On March 13, 1865, Ned was brevetted lieutenant colonel, and on June 17, 1865, he became chief of cavalry for the Upper Arkansas district.³⁸

Ned now found himself in a ticklish situation. Although he considered himself responsible for Chivington's infamy, he was marked as an Indian lover. The irony must have weighed heavily as he was not sure how the Cheyenne would react

towards him when next they met.

He did not have long to wait. Ordered to command the troops which accompanied the peace commission that met with the southern tribes on the Little Arkansas towards the end of 1865, Ned was uneasy at best. He would be pleasantly surprised: "I was immediately recognized by them among whom were many of those who had lost wives and children at Sand Creek; I was surrounded and greeted with the utmost kindness, but mournfully."³⁹ Is it any wonder that Wynkoop now considered the red man human?

Although he had been an innocent dupe in the blood bath just a year before, he now realized his actions to secure peace were more than a whim of his conscience. Black Kettle solidified his opinion when he stated to Ned, "that not for one moment had any of them doubts of [his] good faith."⁴⁰

A treaty was worked out, but not all the leaders were present to sign. Also, as usual, Congress would take its time amending the pact before they, too, would sign. Thus, in early 1866, while still in the army, Wynkoop was sent to get the absent signatures. It was an assignment well-suited to his liking. In February, he distributed annuities to the Cheyennes at Bluff Creek. While he was successful in securing some new signatures to the Treaty of the Little Arkansas, George Bent reported he met hostile opposition from several Dog Soldiers, who refused to make their mark.⁴¹ And that is putting it mildly. The Dog Soldiers, when they finally arrived, two days late, spread out in a line facing Ned. They blamed him for Sand Creek. Later that day, an Arapahoe woman admitted she thought Wynkoop would be killed the next day at council, as Porcupine Bear had sworn to avenge his father's death.⁴²

Interestingly, a New York newspaper called Ned "the best handler of

Indians that has ever been on the Arkansas," and never had to fear harm from them.⁴³ Obviously, this wasn't always so. Although Ned got along fabulously with the red man, he was always walking that fine line between life and death. Whenever the Indians were wronged, there was always someone who felt it was his fault and wanted his scalp.

Wynkoop had faith in his mission and refused to run. However, he wasn't a fool, and always took precautions to preserve himself. The next day when the council took place outside his tent, he had a hidden rifle pointed at Porcupine Bear. Ned's voice won the day, and there was no violence.⁴⁴

In March, Ned heard of a gathering of Cheyenne, Dakota, and Arapahoe warriors bent upon hostilities, and met with them. He not only secured some more marks on the treaty the whites still hadn't ratified, he talked those present from going on the warpath.⁴⁵ And although he now maintained the Indians "exhibited a fervent desire for peace," he would spend the rest of the year and the next trying to get the Dog Soldiers to agree to a new road through their land.⁴⁶

Soon he would be totally disillusioned with the U.S. Senate, for by the time they finally ratified the treaty, they had "entirely changed the face of the document."⁴⁷



Although Ned had secured the release of another white girl, Mary Fletcher, the whites weren't the only ones with complaints.⁴⁸ While distributing annuities on August 14, 1866, Ned was confronted with a proposition—return two red children and replenish the ponies and supplies lost at Sand Creek and the leaders would stop their hotheads from going on the warpath.⁴⁹

Fully aware of the duties entrusted upon himself by the government, Ned summed up his "difficult and perilous undertaking" in 1866 thusly: "The time had come and passed wherein certain distributions had been promised to be made in accordance with the provisions of the treaty; many of the Indians were dissatisfied in consequence of what they considered the breaking of the pledges made to them by the Government."⁵⁰

Tired of army life, particularly the government's failure to fulfill its promises to the red man and its half-hearted attempt to go after Chivington, Ned resigned his commission on July 11, 1866, and traveled to Washington, D.C. Although President Andrew Johnson tried to talk him back into the army, he was adamant—he was out and he was not returning. But there was something he wanted: the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and Apache agency. His son reported his father "believed himself able to do much in the settlement of the vexatious Indian problem if appointed to [this] position."⁵¹ Johnson agreed and Wynkoop was off to Fort Larned to begin his new profession.

By 1867, the white man's thirst to connect the East and West coasts was well under way as the railroads were busily laying track and the decimation of the buffalo was in full swing. The Indians' days were numbered. With each succeeding treaty, the warriors requested arms, for as the white man advanced, it became difficult to obtain game. A few short years before the food supply was abundant, now it was scarce. They had to look upon small game as their major source of food. As agent Jesse Leavenworth stated, "Without am-

muniton [the Indians] must starve."⁵² On January 26, 1867, an order was issued by Colonel A. J. Smith forbidding "any further sales or gifts of arms or ammunition to Indians."⁵³ The Civil War had ended almost two years before and Manifest Destiny was in full swing. Major General Winfield S. Hancock, who knew nothing about the plains or the Indians who lived there, began preparing a massive expedition to the West that supposedly brandished the olive branch. He wrote to Wynkoop, "It is not our desire to bring on difficulties with the Indians, but to treat them with justice and according to our treaty stipulations."⁵⁴ He also wrote, "I wish especially, in my dealing with them, to act through the agents of the Indian Department."⁵⁵ Fine words, but, as we shall see, hardly true.

The Cheyenne and Dakotas arrived at Hancock's camp, near Pawnee Fork, after dark on April 12, 1867. The next day, Hancock, ignoring advice and flaunting his might, moved closer to the Indian village. Fearing an attack, painted warriors met the troops with a long battle line.⁵⁶ As both sides sized the strength of each other up, certain that an engagement would soon be joined, a stalemate came to pass. Knowing how tense the situation was, but certain that his wards wanted peace, Ned rode between the lines. As usual, his words had their magical effect and the Indians agreed to meet with Hancock.⁵⁷

Frightened of treachery, the women and children fled from their homes; the next night the men followed. Wynkoop swore over and over again that the Indians ran because of fear and fear alone, that the entire situation reminded them of Sand Creek.⁵⁸

Angry, Hancock proposed to burn the village. Ned pleaded with him not to, as his wards were innocent of any wrongdoing. In the three short years he had come to know and respect the Indian his idealism never waned, but grew to gigantic proportions. It was almost as if he were on a holy crusade to save the Indian and his civilization from genocide. What he

saw as truth was all that mattered. He predicted that if Hancock destroyed their belongings, an Indian war was imminent. The village was burned on April 19, 1867.⁵⁹ Still, Ned was not about to give up. Determined to avert hostilities at all costs, he decided to "continue with General Hancock as long as there is any probability of him falling in with any of the Indians of my agency."⁶⁰

On April 21, 1867, Ned was outraged when he learned six Cheyennes were attacked, killed, and scalped by one hundred and thirty cavalrymen.⁶¹ If Wynkoop had a fault, it was that he believed, almost blindly, *his* Indians were never wrong, but always wronged. Unfortunately, sometimes his estimations of his wards' innocence was unfounded, as the Cheyennes raided along the Smoky Hill all summer.⁶²

The war eventually wound down. The soldiers, totally inexperienced in plains warfare, were unable to bring their foe to battle. They were outmaneuvered and unprepared to catch the Indian in his land. With winter approaching, the warriors also tired. Another peace council was proposed, this time at Medicine Lodge Creek, sixty miles south of Fort Larned. By mid-September Wynkoop had delivered a supply of provisions.⁶³ He then went amongst the tribes to coax them into attending the meeting.⁶⁴

Again, Ned's life was at risk. Roman Nose, the Cheyenne, blamed him for the destruction of the village at Pawnee Fork and led a raid on the encampment at Medicine Lodge in an attempt to kill Wynkoop. Ned barely escaped, dashing back to Fort Larned and safety.⁶⁵ This, however, didn't deter him, and he returned to the peace council to talk heatedly about, among other complaints, the mishandling of Cheyenne annuities. Like Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer,⁶⁶ he was one of the early whites to point his finger at the government and yell fraud. He cited as examples: blankets that were already rotten, barrels of sugar that were half-empty but sold as if full, and white women's garments that



were totally useless to the Indian. His final and most damning grievance was that fully two-thirds of the annuity goods owed the Indian were never delivered.⁶⁷ Reporter De B. Randolph Keim confirms Wynkoop's views: "A source of constant complaint among the Indians I found to be the inferior quality of the few goods issued to them, though the price paid by the government would secure a far superior article."⁶⁸

The council at Medicine Lodge Creek was glossed over as being completely successful. Maybe. But Captain Albert Barnitz wrote in his journal that the Indians "have no idea what they are giving up," and predicted another war.⁶⁹

Early in 1868, whiskey peddlers were busy selling their wares to the tribes. Shortly thereafter the Cheyenne did some raiding near Council Grove, Kansas. When next Wynkoop made a delivery of annuities on Bluff Creek, he was ordered not to hand over any of the arms promised at Medicine Lodge Creek. The Indians claimed the whites were once again breaking their promises and refused the entire shipment.⁷⁰

Wynkoop immediately began a campaign for the release of the frozen arms. Finally, Commissioner N. G. Taylor granted his wish: "The Secretary of the Interior directs that you exercise your discretion about issuing to the Indians all their annuity goods, including their arms and ammunition which were promised."⁷¹ But it was too late. In Custer's *My Life on the Plains*, he quotes Ned's letter of August 10, 1868, where the agent happily reported the delivery of goods to everyone's delight, and then sadly told of some Cheyennes who had gone on the warpath.⁷² A raid on the Pawnees had led to an attack on whites in the Saline Valley.⁷³

On August 19, 1868, Ned met with Little Rock. The chief admitted that the Cheyenne were at war and even named those who were to blame. But he was powerless to do anything about them.⁷⁴ The next day Ned met with Major General Philip Sheridan. Concerned for the safety of Little Rock's band, whom he thought were innocent, Ned half-heartedly blamed the Dakota for the outbreak. Sheridan promised to protect Little Rock and his people from the upcoming war if they came to Fort Larned

and handed over the guilty parties.⁷⁵ Impossible demands, and Wynkoop knew it.

The border cry of *extermination* sang out once again.⁷⁶ In desperation, Wynkoop proposed to divide the good Indians from the evil.⁷⁷ Custer confirmed that Ned's suggestion was hopeless when he reported Sherman commented, "So long as Agent Wynkoop remains at Fort Larned the vagabond part of his Indians will cluster about him for support and to beg of the military," and then dryly stated Sherman contended there shouldn't be any safe zones.⁷⁸

With all his hopes of peace disintegrating, Ned applied for a leave of absence, leaving Fort Larned on September 17, 1868.⁷⁹ At a loss of what to do, he was still hiding out in the East on November 7, 1868.⁸⁰ However, by November 15, 1868, he was enroute to Fort Cobb. But he did not share Superintendent Murphy's opinion that his wards would "assemble at [Cobb], and gladly avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered them to get out of the way of the military and obtain their annuities."⁸¹ Keim, who accompanied Sheridan during the campaign, wrote:



KANSAS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

COLONEL WYNKOOP WITH "TEXAS JACK" CRAWFORD.

"A review of our Indian difficulties shows, also, that the Indian has been treated frequently with the greatest injustice and falsehood."⁸² Ned couldn't have agreed more and blamed himself for Sand Creek and Pawnee Fork. On November 29, 1868, he submitted his resignation to Taylor, refusing to be a part of the coming blood bath, "to again be the instrument of the murder of innocent women and children."⁸³ Discouraged and defeated, Wynkoop headed east.

Thus ended Wynkoop's relationship with the Indian. It was special while it lasted. He gave his all to deal with them faithfully. Perhaps too much so. Certainly his heart led the way at times when it shouldn't have. He was vocal, and never shied away from what he felt was right.

Back east he used the press to tear into the government and its handling of the Indian situation. But unfortunately he again let his emotions interfere with his judgment, and some

of his allegations were unfounded, eventually discrediting him.⁸⁴

What made Edward Wynkoop, who had been so close to finding his niche on earth but now never would, an exceptional man for his times, was his open mind. From first caressing the usual opinion of the red man on the prairie in 1864, that the Indian was "a wild beast, and should be treated accordingly,"⁸⁵ he made a complete aboutface. He was graced with humanity, something that was

in short order in the rough existence on the plains, and when presented with the opportunity to bring about peace, did not allow his prejudice to interfere with what he considered his duty to mankind. His daring to reach out and touch those who were foreign to him was way ahead of its time. ★

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60. *Ibid.*, p. 103, Edward W. Wynkoop letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs N. G. Taylor, April 18, 1867.
61. *Ibid.*, Wynkoop to N. G. Taylor, April 21, 1867, p. 102.
62. Carroll, Washita, p. 102, Wynkoop to Taylor, April 21, 1867, Philip H. Sheridan Report to Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman, September 26, 1868, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Container 83 of the Sheridan Papers; Hoig, *Chiefs*, p. 100, *Chicago Times*, November 22, 1867.
63. Hoig, *Battle*, p. 24.
64. Carroll, Washita, p. 85, Wynkoop to Taylor, January 11, 1869.
65. Hoig, *Chiefs*, p. 100, *Chicago Times*, November 22, 1867; Hoig, *Battle*, p. 24.
66. John M. Carroll, ed., *A Custer Chrestomathy* (Privately printed, n.d.), Custer's Testimony before the Clymer Committee, pp. 46-67.
67. Hoig, *Battle*, p. 28.
68. De B. Randolph Keim, *Sheridan's Troopers on the Borders* (Williamstown, Mass.: Corner House Publishers, 1973 reprint of the 1899 edition, which is a reprint of the 1870 publication), p. 291; hereafter cited as *Troopers*.
69. Robert M. Utley, ed., *Life in Custer's Cavalry (Diaries and Letters of Albert and Jennie Barnitz, 1867-1868)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), October 28, 1867, p. 115.
70. Charles J. Brill, *Conquest of the Southern Plains* (Oklahoma City, OK: Golden Saga Publishers, 1938), pp. 107-108, Wynkoop letter to Murphy, July 20, 1868, hereafter cited as *Conquest*; Hoig, *Battle*, pp. 44-45; Hoig, *Chiefs*, p. 117; Paul Andrew Hutton, *Phil Sheridan and His Army* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), pp. 37-38; hereafter cited as *Sheridan*.
71. Brill, *Conquest*, p. 109, N. G. Taylor to Wynkoop, July 23, 1868.
72. Sheridan Report of September 26, 1868, Container 83, Sheridan Papers; Custer, *Life*, pp. 151-152.
73. Brill, *Conquest*, p. 110.
74. Custer, *Life*, pp. 153-156; Hoig, *Chiefs*, p. 118, where some of Black Kettle's young braves are named.
75. Hutton, *Sheridan*, p. 41, Sheridan Report of September 26, 1868, Container 83, Sheridan Papers. Wynkoop met with Sheridan on 20 August 1868.
76. Carroll, Washita, p. 15, Sherman to Sheridan, October 15, 1868.
77. Custer, *Life*, p. 157.
78. Carroll, Washita, pp. 11-12, Sherman Report of August 19, 1868; Custer, *Life*, pp. 157-158.
79. Hoig, *Battle*, p. 52; Hutton, *Sheridan*, p. 41.
80. Hoig, *Battle*, p. 89.
81. Carroll, Washita, pp. 79-80, Murphy to Taylor, November 15, 1868.
82. Keim, *Troopers*, p. 293.
83. Carroll, Washita, pp. 80-81, Wynkoop to Taylor enroute to Fort Cobb, November 29, 1868.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87, Wynkoop letter to Taylor, January 26, 1869, where he tears into the Washita attack and offers his proof.
85. F. Wynkoop, *Unfinished*, p. 28 (XXX).